



## CRITICAL STUDY OF LAW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONCERNING BOARD OF DIRECTORS' POSITION AND PROTECTION UNDER COMPANY LAW

**AUTHOR** – ADV. ARYA ANIL, STUDENT AT AMITY UNIVERISTY, NOIDA

**BEST CITATION** – ADV. ARYA ANIL, CRITICAL STUDY OF LAW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONCERNING BOARD OF DIRECTORS' POSITION AND PROTECTION UNDER COMPANY LAW, 4 (1) OF 2025, PG. 993-1000, APIS – 3920-0007 | ISSN – 2583-7230.

### Abstract

Corporate governance in India's business environment gradually advanced to become an essential mechanism which upholds both ethical practices and stakeholder trust while driving long-term economic growth. This research investigates the evolving landscape of corporate governance with a critical focus on the position and protection of the Board of Directors within company law. In the context of expanding organizational structures, directors are no longer confined to fiduciary obligations but are entrusted with steering governance frameworks, ensuring statutory compliance, and promoting responsible corporate conduct.

The research investigates executive-level legislative reform through the Companies Act 2013 and SEBI regulations that focus on increasing board autonomy and defining management accountability while improving transparency. A hybrid governance instrument prevails in India because it integrates Anglo-American business principles with unique indigenous ownership systems under which promoters retain control yet enforcement remains weak. The main objective of this research consists of analyzing corporate governance theory together with evaluating how well statutory protections and corporate practices secure and bolster the Board's capabilities. This document follows by exploring crucial aspects of director accountability and regulatory overlap as well as minority protection along with practical effects of independent oversight.

Evaluations rooted in both legal doctrine and practical governance illustrate that board effectiveness plays a pivotal role in preserving corporate accountability and ensuring shareholder protection.

The competitive global economy demands that India adopts a governance system devoted to director independence and ethical disclosure strategies and institutional oversight for sustaining corporate trustworthiness.

**Keywords:** Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Transparency, Fiduciary Duty, Companies Act, SEBI Clause 49<sup>745</sup>

GRASP - EDUCATE - EVOLVE

<sup>745</sup> SEBI, Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement, Circular No. CFD/DIL/CG/1/2004/12/10 (Oct. 29, 2004).



## Introduction

### Conceptual Framework of Corporate Governance

Research and policy discussions about corporate governance focus in countries throughout the entire world. The importance of governance systems continues to rise because research demonstrates that corporate governance structures significantly affect profitability and growth levels<sup>746</sup>. Business production and investment decisions are influenced by multiple channels that include ownership and control structure together with financial intermediary development and capital market expansion and corporate financing practices and investor protection mechanisms and creditor rights systems.

### Evolution of Corporate Governance in India

After the government accepted the structural adjustment and globalization program in July 1991 corporate governance emerged as an essential topic in India. The focus of public concern shifted toward investor protection along with operational transparency in business and industry as well as compliance with international standards for financial organization disclosure because India integrated into global markets and companies depended more heavily on capital and debt markets for funding purposes.

Indian corporate governance operates as a fusion of Anglo-Saxon governance models employed by the United States and United Kingdom while integrating elements of German and Japanese bank-dominated structures. The high debt levels that characterize Indian enterprises stand as a main differentiator compared to businesses operating in developed nations. Companies operating in India seek more capital from external countries compared to internal sources. In India, banks and financial institutions (FIs) serve as both lenders and equity investors in Indian

businesses. The debt market is practically extinct while the equity market experiences low development in India according to Goswami (2000)<sup>747</sup>. Big share blocks throughout most organizations remain in control of both financial institutions along with business associations

### The Role and Structure of Boards in India

The Institute of Company Secretaries of India (ICSI) delivers an extensive definition of corporate governance by stating that it includes more than standard management practices and involves an equitable method for conducting transparent operations to reach well-established goals<sup>748</sup>. A company operates through this framework to reach strategic targets which fulfill shareholder requirements along with debt obligations and worker needs while delivering to clients and suppliers while upholding all regulatory standards and environment protection initiatives for community welfare. A well-structured system implementation of management methodology results in development of legal frameworks together with commercial institutions and institutional boundaries defining operational areas.

The definition of governance rests on decision-making about extensive organizational purpose uses of assets while settling disagreements amongst diverse stakeholders. Modern organizations must prioritize setting due to their broad variety of participants. A modern organization entrusts its management functions to implementation teams who lead operations. The day-to-day administrative responsibilities and decisions made on behalf of the firm belong to this managerial team which omits the company owners.

The UK uses the meaning of corporate governance primarily from the important financial aspects presented in the Cadbury Committee Report of 1992. The Cadbury Report stands as the foundational model which serves

<sup>746</sup> Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997).

<sup>747</sup> Omkar Goswami, Corporate Governance in India, *ECON. & POL. WKLY.*, Jan. 22, 2000, at 407.

<sup>748</sup> Inst. of Co. Secys of India, *Corporate Governance Guidelines* (2003).



both local and international administrative frameworks for corporate governance today. Corporate governance defines the system through which organizations function while directors hold main accountability for its implementation according to Cadbury. As the modern edition of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2016)<sup>749</sup> reflects by still using the Cadbury Report's principles today, the fundamental reason of corporate governance remains to create dedicated innovative and rational management systems which drive long-term business success<sup>750</sup>. Corporate governance 'gives the design that directs organizational target setting and the execution process for helping to monitor results' according to the world-relevant G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance<sup>751</sup>. The explanations above contribute distinct levels of understanding to the business practice aspects of corporate management.

### Major Failures and Scandals: The Push for Reform

The discovery of significant security frauds emerged in April 1992<sup>752</sup>. A large number of banks were involved in this incident which caused the stock market to plummet for the first time post-reforms in 1991<sup>753</sup>. Second there was a rapid increase in cases where multinational companies used preferential equity allotments to strengthen their controlling group positions through steep market price discounts. During 1993-94 the third scandal involved disappearing businesses. During July 1993 through September 1994 the stock market index increased by 120 percent. The market turmoil witnessed hundreds of small unknown businesses engage in large share premium issuance which investment banks promoted through deceptive prospectuses. Small

investors became the victims of the funds' mismanagement because company officials diverted the funds away from their businesses to personal pockets thereby owning stocks of bankrupt companies. Market confidence collapsed after this incident caused the primary market to remain destroyed for six consecutive years.

The financing through stock issued by businesses during pre-independence India created an advanced equity investment culture among urban investors by the 1950s.

The financial industry of India stood remarkably advanced despite being an underdeveloped country. Private banks granted working capital to entrepreneurs while maintaining industry standards of fund distribution and they functioned within the framework of strong recovery laws. The establishment of a complete body of corporate law in colonial India came naturally because contemporary economic growth relies on corporate organizations.

The 1956 Businesses Act originates from previous Indian firms acts to establish rules for both public and private limited companies. The majority of current laws governing corporate issues alongside the protective banking regulations existed before independence was achieved. A legislative framework for stocks and securities trading received its approval during 1956. The corporate sector in India in 1947 produced at least 10% of GDP while stock markets operated effectively and banks maintained sophisticated development levels together with an extensive body of laws that governed corporate operations.

The industrial sector included establishments that focused on companies and markets for stocks and bank trusts along with equity-driven management practices among the people in urban centers. In all likelihood the British colony demonstrated the best capabilities regarding corporate governance practices and

<sup>749</sup> Fi Comm. on the Fin. Aspects of Corp. Governance, *The Cadbury Report* (1992) (U.K.).

<sup>750</sup> The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, *The Cadbury Report* (1992)

<sup>751</sup> OECD, *G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance* (2015), <https://www.oecd.org/corporate/principles-corporate-governance.htm>.

<sup>752</sup> S.S. Tarapore, *The Indian Financial Sector: Contemporary Issues and Challenges*, RBI BULL., Apr. 1992.

<sup>753</sup> D.R. Gadgil, *The Industrial Evolution of India* (Oxford Univ. Press 1942).





shareholder rights protection along with maximizing long-term business objectives<sup>754</sup>.

The situation turned out different from expected. Existing and new industrial units needed to receive their authorizations from the central government through the 1951 Industries (Development and Regulation) Act<sup>755</sup>. The licensing system encouraged rent-seeking. The rights of these entrepreneurial families and business groups who made their money from textile and steel industries were established through licensing procedures to obtain monopoly or oligopoly positions in developing sectors such as aluminum, paper, cement and engineering. As time passed the licensing process grew complicated because it demanded approvals from multiple ministries for various procedures.

A regular private manufacturing organization must secure official approval for all major activities ranging from new factory establishment to new product development through facility enlargement to relocation and capital goods imports. In 1991, the law was repealed. The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 under socialist policies declared that public-sector enterprises would rule economic control while defining ownership expansion across multiple industries. A massive public sector industrial and services domain materialized because of these developments alongside all its dysfunctionalities which included inefficiencies and cost disadvantages and corporate governance problems.

The situation proved to be different from what was expected. The 1951 Industries (Development and Regulation) Act became the first regulatory obstacle to investment through requiring both existing industrial operations and proposed new units to obtain central government licenses. The licensing system encouraged rent-seeking. Monopolistic and oligopolistic control rights in new industries like aluminum and paper and

cement and engineering belonged to entrepreneurs from business groups who made their fortunes through textiles along with coal iron steel and jute. Several ministries in the nation gradually expanded their licensing requirements through additional authorization processes so more approvals were needed.

A standard private manufacturing firm needs governmental approval to begin new factory operations and manufacture new products while expanding their capacity and relocating facilities and conducting imports of capital goods as well as multiple other activities. In 1991, the law was repealed. The 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution established socialism by making the public sector the economic leader while establishing which sectors would fall under full or increasing government control. A substantial segment of the state-owned industrial base and services sector established through this era brought along with it various problematic faults and inefficient operations and cost disadvantages and also numerous corporate governance challenges.

Throughout the years from 1968 to 1973 the pattern toward limited business investment combined with unproductive production methods intensified substantially. Under the 1969 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act industrial licensing became conditional upon the monopolistic classification of private firms based on their possession values. Privately-held companies with assets starting at Rs.10 million and going up to Rs.1 billion needed additional permissions beyond their initial licenses to enlarge their capacity but these extra approvals were typically refused by the authorities. Nationalization spread across the entire nation by first picking up insurance firms and banking entities then proceeding to nationalize petroleum corporations and coal mining operations. Nationalization served as one main objective to defend employment positions.

During the 1970s and early 1980s governments of successive female prime ministers

<sup>754</sup> D.R. Gadgil, *The Industrial Evolution of India*, Oxford University Press, 1942

<sup>755</sup> Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, No. 65 of 1951, INDIA CODE (1951).



nationalized privately bankrupt textile mills and engineering firms which resulted in turning their financial problems into expensive public debt obligations. The government treats the expression "tiny is beautiful" as if it were an object of religious worship. The 1980s witnessed an increase in numerous technologically limited mini-plants while governments created diverse mini-production facilities which depended on massive tax benefits alongside high debt levels and advantageous long-term lending programs and strict trade barriers and continuous government business support. Second in their strategy the government supported small-scale manufacturing operations.

While this isn't necessarily a bad thing—small and medium businesses are frequently more efficient and adaptable than larger corporations—the small-scale sector has been aided by a variety of artificial tactics, including as tax breaks and product reserves. More than 800 product lines are still kept for the small-scale industry, with over 600 of them not even made in India. In an open, outward-oriented economy, such distortions would not have existed.

Besides concessionary fares for the United Kingdom as well as other British empire countries, there were no substantial trade barriers in place during the colonial period. As a result, the key industries that thrived prior to independence were able to compete, with exports driving the jute and tea industries.

Import substitution required businesses to show bureaucrats why any import was necessary, and the philosophy of indigenous availability mandated the procurement of Indian inputs even when relatively low products were more expensive than superior imports. Quantitative constraints, governed by several types of import licenses, and high tariffs kept import substitution alive. By 1985, the average tariff rate for intermediate products was 146 percent and 107 percent for capital goods. While some of the policies helped to establish industrial capacity,

particularly in engineering, drugs and pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, and petrochemicals, they also generated heavily secured markets, fostered in competitiveness, and encouraged large-scale rent-seeking, providing fertile ground for corporate mismanagement. The corporate and personal income tax structures were added to this.

The high tax rates generated excessive temptations for executives to commit tax evasion through hidden cash bonuses and corporate payment of personal expenses while using complicated honorarium schemes mixed with complex mutual share ownership structures. The warning was direct along with its threatening content. The most crucial factor became the separation of bigger portions from smaller pie segments and escaping from tax detection. The system lacked any motivating factors for developing the company resources beyond personal accumulation which could be distributed fairly and transparently to all stakeholders.

After independence the government launched three combined development finance institutions throughout the nation including "the Industrial Finance Corporation of India, the Industrial Development Bank of India, and the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI)." Each state government maintains its own financial corporate institution. These public sector DFIs operated during the pre-1990s period to achieve industrial modernization through their extended financing schemes with cheap discounted interest rates. Long-term loans to develop manufacturing capabilities should not be seen as problematic for the Republic of Korea since their government has achieved fiscal stability through surplus revenues. Public institutions that primarily disperse loans for approval achieved the highest scores through loan pushing while neglecting proper project evaluations instead of focusing on asset quality this combination of restricted control and strict licensing in an import-substitution environment ultimately results in public fund mismanagement through



crony capitalism and corporate wastefulness. The same situation existed in India during the 1970s along with the succeeding 1980s. DFIs engage in corporate mismanagement through two separate effects: the first relates to extreme debt levels and the second originates from their role as shareholders.

### **Corporate Governance and Economic Liberalization**

Through term loans directed at industrial projects many promoters established new businesses using a limited amount of funding that served as their business equity in the early 1980s. During the industrial growth period of the 1970s and 1980s the dominating groups reduced their average share ownership to 15%. The promoters of a Rs500 million business needed only Rs100 million equity to start it up but their actual investment was just Rs15 million which had control rights [India, Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951]. Debtors recovered their funding yet stopped paying back the loans in various situations that followed. Enterprise agencies together with politicians developed a dating that enabled perpetual scheduling of defaulted debt to support financially troubled business operations. Financial failure guidelines implementation problems during this phase resulted in extensive corporate mismanagement due to major misallocation of DFI budget to unrelated projects. Nine years following the introduction of economic liberalization the DFIs along with nationalized insurance companies and the government-run mutual fund (the Unit Trust of India) collectively maintain strong control of private sector enterprise equity shares. Indirect government ownership of corporate equity at the same time spawned sub-optimal corporate governance because of inadequate monitoring systems. Institutional shareholders used their power to nominate their selected administrators to corporate boards yet most of these nominees proved incompetent on a best-case scenario while others served as lapdogs for the current leadership regardless of performance.

Theoretical positioning of the three DFIs made them appropriate for overseeing company governance activities during the 1970s and 1980s period. Good execution of their processes would have simultaneously reduced the corporate expenses from debt and equity yet these organizations failed to achieve this. The biases surrounding government control of DFIs and the country-business relationship caused administrative voting with venture promoter interests to become the main cause of fairness failure. The shortage of sufficient profit reporting alongside provisioning requirements and poor bankruptcy recovery systems together with other factors caused debt-related issues. India began its monetary liberalization program when the financial situation had turned excessively complicated. The U.S. had multiple advantages that surpassed those of most developing nations including extensive business operations from complex petrochemicals to basic toy manufacturing and detailed regulation of businesses alongside shareholder protection.

Many distinct aspects led to dangerous corporate governance environments. A company management system works based on the combination of prison laws and regulatory bodies and institutional structures together with moral conventions that shape society. The authors demonstrate that social considerations of business must be examined to provide proper commercial leadership. Social elements guide business leadership in the correct path. The corporate change option of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) creates favorable as well as unfavorable effects which will impact both target companies and acquiring organizations.

The entire text of this paper examines corporate governance methods and social responsibility that influence acquisition and merger decisions<sup>756</sup>.

<sup>756</sup> Rajesh Chakrabarti, Corporate Governance in India: Evolution and Challenges, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES. Working Paper No. 16493 (2011).





The corporation dedicated specific focus to the study of M&A strategies together with their enhancement for business expansion. The paper features essential M&A topic figures from this field of research. The paper provides a thorough theoretical review that emerges from both extensive literature research and practical findings. Corporate governance stands as the central theme which dominates business world operations. The stage of governance must deal with numerous challenging choices that require prompt behavior together with cultural norm creation while meeting stakeholder expectations. The method that controls business operations holds vital weight for the success of companies. The issue of governance can be studied by understanding how stakeholders' interests connect with each other. Corporate governance serves as an effective control system to maximize operational Value in enterprise assets including human and physical resources. Company governance constructs its foundational elements based on community institutional and regulatory and ethical and legal standards which operate within the prison sphere. The significant six global trends that can be seen globally are identified below :

- corporate governance systems must be rapidly expanded worldwide by updating and extending regulatory codes.
- extended consciousness on board professionalism;
- selective remodel of company management roles;
- It becomes necessary to review company reporting requirements while also evaluating the company's reporting needs.
- extra extensive outside scrutiny of company governance and
- extended interest to corporations' effect on society.

A brand-new perspective of business governance leads to sports and pressures which function as the fundamental element in defining an organization's purpose. Agency

leaders need to develop clear central values with caution and maintain them uniformly understood between investors and all their affected constituencies including prison authorities and societal opinion maintainers. The challenge of appropriate company governance proves to be highly complicated. Corporate governance shows a direct link with managerial systems through its examination of authority together with responsibility functions while also establishing methods to fulfill corporate objectives. The main goal of corporate governance exists to sustain stakeholder trust in managerial authorities within organizations. On different hand, to shield shareholders' hobbies (profits).

### **Mergers and Acquisitions: Governance Impact**

Mergers and Acquisitions:

Business entities frequently develop fresh operational strategies and market models to improve their abilities quickly in response to changing customer needs and industry competition patterns. One possible approach for company governance to select appropriate agency techniques is through increase strategies. An organization needs to execute the chosen increase approach it has chosen. The three options available for consideration are Merger and Acquisitions along with Internal developments followed by strategic partnering. The lack of time management expertise along with insufficient operations expertise and control skills prevents certain companies from utilizing environmental opportunities to drive their growth through internal development processes. The acquisition or purchase of other business entities leads to speed-up or incremental growth of revenues along with profits and assets. Through outside growth the agency benefits from organizational synergies with external entities to enhance its competitive positioning.

### **Conclusion**

Corporate governance in India has evolved into a multidimensional construct that plays a



pivotal role in aligning corporate objectives with stakeholder interests, legal compliance, and ethical responsibility. This paper's analysis reveals that while India's legal and institutional foundations for governance are robust, especially with the introduction of the Companies Act, 2013 and SEBI's regulatory frameworks, critical gaps in enforcement, board independence, and stakeholder accountability remain<sup>757</sup>.

The study emphasizes the Board of Directors as the fulcrum of effective governance, responsible not only for strategic decision-making but also for upholding fiduciary duties and ensuring transparency. However, systemic challenges such as promoter dominance, overlapping regulatory authority, weak disclosure practices, and limited protection for minority shareholders continue to constrain board effectiveness. Historical insights show that despite early advancements in financial institutions and legal infrastructure, decades of licensing, protectionism, and public-sector dominance diluted the effectiveness of corporate control mechanisms and accountability systems.

As India seeks greater integration into the global economic system, adopting international best practices in corporate governance is not just aspirational but essential. Ensuring independent and qualified board representation, fostering a compliance-driven culture, and leveraging regulatory reforms must be prioritized to achieve transparency, investor confidence, and sustainable growth. Furthermore, the intersection of governance with emerging dimensions like ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) compliance, digital governance, and shareholder activism calls for a more proactive, responsive, and inclusive governance framework.

Ultimately, this study reaffirms that good governance is not merely a regulatory obligation but a strategic imperative. It demands a cultural shift across Indian

corporate entities—one that values ethical leadership, responsible management, and institutional accountability. Only then can Indian corporations safeguard their long-term legitimacy and competitiveness in a dynamic global marketplace.

<sup>757</sup> The Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013).