“UNMASKING THE ELECTORAL BOND SCHEME: CHARTING A NEW COURSE FOR POLITICAL FUNDING IN THE LIGHT OF SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT”

“UNMASKING THE ELECTORAL BOND SCHEME: CHARTING A NEW COURSE FOR POLITICAL FUNDING IN THE LIGHT OF SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT”

“UNMASKING THE ELECTORAL BOND SCHEME: CHARTING A NEW COURSE FOR POLITICAL FUNDING IN THE LIGHT OF SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT”

AUTHOR – ANEESH THOMAS K, LLM SCHOLAR AT CHRIST UNIVERSITY, BANGALORE

BEST CITATION – ANEESH THOMAS K, “UNMASKING THE ELECTORAL BOND SCHEME: CHARTING A NEW COURSE FOR POLITICAL FUNDING IN THE LIGHT OF SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT”, ILE MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL, 3 (1) OF 2024, PG. 237-244, APIS – 3920-0007 | ISSN – 2583-7230.

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the Electoral Bond Scheme, initiated in India in January 2018, aimed at reforming political funding by enhancing transparency and accountability in political donations. Through this scheme, individuals and corporate entities can purchase electoral bonds from selected branches of the State Bank of India, which facilitates anonymous contributions to political parties. This anonymity was designed to protect donors from potential political retaliation, encouraging a wider base of financial support for political activities. However, the scheme’s implementation has sparked significant debate over its impact on the democratic process, particularly concerning transparency and the potential for undisclosed corporate influence on politics. The function of money in politics is the subject of political party financing. Effective government and inclusive democracy depend on funding, which enables political parties and candidates to connect with people and establish enduring political organizations. But it can also result in government contracts going to the corporation that contributed the most money during the last election campaign rather than the one with the strongest proposal, and politicians and parties listening to their donors rather than their voters. The Supreme Court of India’s recent ruling, declaring the scheme and corresponding amendments to the Representation of the People Act, 1951, as unconstitutional, underscores the contentious nature of the electoral bonds. The critique centers on the scheme’s provision for anonymity, which, while protecting donors, simultaneously obscures the sources of political funding, raising concerns about accountability and the influence of untraceable funds in electoral politics. This paper delves into the complexities surrounding the Electoral Bond Scheme, articulating its intended benefits, such as the reduction of cash transactions in political funding, alongside its drawbacks, notably the lack of transparency and potential for concentrating power within a single financial institution. By comparing this funding mechanism with those of other democracies, notably the USA, the study explores alternative models of political funding that might offer higher levels of transparency and fairness. Through this comparative analysis, the paper proposes a restructured approach to political funding in India, aiming to strike a balance between donor privacy and the public’s right to know the origins of political contributions, thereby fostering a more transparent, accountable, and democratic electoral process.